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NO. 33 AUGUST 2019 Introduction 
Climate Neutrality as Long-term Strategy 
The EU’s Net Zero Target and Its Consequences for Member States 
Oliver Geden and Felix Schenuit 
As a traditional frontrunner in international climate policy, the European Union (EU) 
is under great pressure to meet global expectations. In 2020, it must present its long-
term decarbonisation strategy to the United Nations. Political attention has so far 
focussed on the lack of consensus among the Member States on whether they should 
adopt the European Commission’s proposed goal of “greenhouse gas neutrality” by 
2050. Two aspects of this decision have hardly been debated so far – first, the ques-
tion of whether this will herald the end of differentiated reduction commitments by 
Member States, and second, the tightening of the EU climate target for 2030. National 
governments and climate policymakers will have to take both issues into account. 
 
Since 1990, the EU has reduced its green-
house gas emissions by 23 per cent. This 
puts it far ahead of any Western industrial-
ised nation. The EU reduction target for 
2030 of at least 40 per cent, submitted 
under the Paris Agreement, is also compar-
atively ambitious. Several relevant legis-
lative procedures were completed in 2018: 
EU-wide emissions trading (ETS Directive), 
Member States’ targets for sectors not 
covered by the ETS, such as transport and 
agriculture (Effort Sharing Regulation, ESR), 
and a new regulation on emissions from 
land use, land use change and forestry 
(LULUCF Regulation). In view of these steps, 
it is very likely that the current EU climate 
target will be reached by 2030. If the targets 
for improving energy efficiency and the 
share of renewable energy – neither of 
which is legally binding for Member States 
– are also achieved, a reduction of as much 
as 45 per cent could be delivered by 2030, 
according to the Commission. 
Global Expectations 
At the Paris climate summit in 2015, the EU 
committed itself to presenting a long-term 
emission reduction strategy by 2020. At the 
same time, it is expected that the EU will 
live up to the promise made in the Paris 
Agreement to successively increase national 
contributions to combat climate change 
(nationally determined contributions, 
NDCs). This is the only way to maintain the 
hope that the world will move from its cur-
rent course of 3 to 3.5 degrees Celsius (°C) 
by 2100 towards the target corridor of 1.5 to 
2°C agreed in Paris. According to the 1.5°C 
Special Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC SR1.5), glob-
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al emissions will have to fall to zero in the 
coming decades. Residual emissions that 
cannot be eliminated completely or are very 
difficult to mitigate (e.g. from agriculture, 
the steel and cement industries, or air traf-
fic) would be offset with “negative emis-
sions” by using biological or technical 
methods. If only carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sions are considered, these will have to be 
reduced to “net zero” worldwide by 2050. 
For the much more ambitious reduction of 
all greenhouse gases (GHGs) to net zero, the 
IPCC SR1.5 indicates the target year 2067. 
Against this background, the Juncker 
Commission presented a draft for a long-
term EU climate strategy at the end of 2018. 
The strategy proposes to strengthen the 
European GHG reduction target for 2050 
from the current 80–95 per cent to a (net) 
100 per cent in order to achieve “green-
house gas neutrality” or “climate neutrali-
ty”. While developing the strategy, the 
Commission took care to minimise political 
resistance in three ways. Unlike the climate 
and energy roadmaps for 2050 presented in 
2011, which Poland vetoed, the Member 
States will not formally vote on the Com-
mission’s communication. The Commission 
document is only seen as a draft strategy, 
on the basis of which the Council of the EU 
will develop its own ideas and finally report 
them to the United Nations (UN). The Com-
mission’s strategy favours a zero emissions 
target for 2050, but it also declares that the 
current target corridor of 80–95 per cent is 
compatible with the Paris Agreement. In 
the Commission’s view, the current target 
corresponds to a fair EU contribution 
towards reaching the upper limit of the 
global target corridor of 1.5–2°C, whereas 
the proposed net zero emissions target by 
2050 aims at the lower limit. Furthermore, 
the Juncker Commission’s proposal avoids 
deriving the obvious conclusion that the EU 
climate target for 2030 will also have to be 
tightened if the EU sets a 2050 climate 
neutrality target. 
European Council at the Centre 
The European Parliament (EP) demanded a 
zero emissions target for 2050 as early as 
the beginning of 2018, but it does not have 
a role in the decision-making process. Major 
strategic decisions such as on an overall EU 
climate target are taken in the European 
Council and require a consensus among the 
current 28 heads of state and government. 
The Member States alone will decide on the 
strategy document to be submitted to the 
UN. The EP would only come into play as 
an equal co-legislator to adjust the main 
directives and regulations if changes were 
made to the current 2030 target. In the 
Council of the EU, Member States would 
not decide by consensus on legislative 
issues but by qualified majority voting. 
At the meeting of the European Council in 
June 2019, a consensus failed because of 
resistance from Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Estonia. Among other things, 
they are demanding more time for detailed 
national impact analyses. They are also 
pressing for political and financial conces-
sions from the EU, particularly from the 
climate progressive Member States. By June, 
however, 22 governments had already ex-
plicitly endorsed the Commission’s pro-
posal, and in some Member States, such as 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and France, 
national net zero targets have already been 
adopted. Furthermore, all EU Member 
States pledged in Paris to aim for global net 
zero emissions “in the second half of this 
century”. It can therefore be assumed that 
the European Council will eventually reach 
an agreement in late 2019 or early 2020 at 
one of its regular summits. 
Elements of the Negotiation 
Package 
The heads of state and government only 
have to adopt a new long-term climate 
target. The elaboration and adoption of the 
strategy to be reported to the UN is left to 
the Environment Council. There is no pre-
defined format for the resulting documents. 
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This flexibility gives Member States room 
for manoeuvre in setting political priorities 
and deliberately omitting points of dis-
agreement that cannot be overcome for the 
time being. Much more important politi-
cally is the process in the European Coun-
cil. The crucial decision is, first of all, which 
net zero target year the heads of state and 
government can agree on. In addition, some 
conditions will be set for the implementa-
tion of the new strategy. 
Two fundamental questions will be at 
the heart of this. What degree of differen-
tiation between Member States’ efforts is 
still possible and justifiable in the long 
term (convergence)? How do politically attrac-
tive and scientifically informed long-term 
goals relate to the lack of willingness to 
implement corresponding measures in the 
short to medium term (consistency)? 
Net Zero Target Year 
The current state of the debate suggests 
that a zero emissions target for 2050 can be 
agreed. A later target year or corridor (e.g. 
2050–2060) has not yet been suggested by 
Poland and its allies, although 2055 or 2060 
could still be considered “Paris compatible”, 
according to the Commission. This assess-
ment is strongly opposed by environmental 
NGOs, which usually demand a target year 
of 2040. However, it is undisputed among 
climate policy actors in Europe that the EU 
must achieve GHG neutrality earlier than 
the global average due to its historical 
responsibility and its economic capacity. 
Options for Future 
Differentiation 
As a precondition for agreeing to a net zero 
target by 2050, Poland and its allies are 
already demanding financial compensation. 
Linking the climate strategy decision to the 
negotiations over the EU’s new Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027 
could further delay the adoption of a new 
climate target, since MFF negotiations are 
expected to last until early 2020. But Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries could 
also try to maintain the current differentia-
tion of national emission reduction targets 
until the middle of the century – a de-
mand that has already been indicated. 
Under this condition, a “net zero” EU would 
mean that Central and Eastern European 
countries are not yet at zero by 2050. Their 
higher net emission levels could be offset 
by net negative balances in frontrunner 
countries from Northern and Western 
Europe, meaning that by mid-century the 
latter would need to remove more CO2 from 
the atmosphere than they emit – a sce-
nario they are not prepared for. This would 
not only require massive afforestation in 
the countries concerned, but even more so 
the use of specific negative emissions tech-
nologies. These include the direct capture 
of CO2 from ambient air with subsequent 
underground storage and the use of bio-
energy with carbon capture and storage. 
In the legal acts adopted in 2018, it 
was stipulated that from 2021 onwards, 
national obligations beyond the ETS could 
be offset to a limited extent by “negative 
emissions” generated primarily by forestry 
under the LULUCF Regulation. The Central 
and Eastern European countries will press 
for these offsetting options to be expanded. 
They could find allies in countries whose 
emission profiles are strongly influenced by 
agriculture (Ireland) or forestry (Finland). 
2030 Climate Target and NDCs 
Even though the debate on an EU net zero 
emissions target for 2050 is so far only 
marginally concerned with the effects on 
the 2030 target, both decisions are closely 
interlinked in terms of procedure and 
timing. Although it is not mandatory to 
step up efforts by 2030, failure to do so 
would damage the EU’s credibility. 
First, a 40 per cent reduction by 2030 is 
not compatible with the goal of greenhouse 
gas neutrality by 2050. This would require 
an enormous increase in ambitions after 
2030, which hardly seems feasible. Second, 
the Paris Agreement requires parties to 
submit or update their NDCs for 2030 nine 
months prior to the 26th UN Climate Sum-
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mit (COP26) in December 2020. Since the 
EU has always been a strong supporter of a 
“ratcheting-up” mechanism, it is expected 
to make a substantial contribution. The 
option of placing the Commission’s calcu-
lated “de facto” reduction of 45 per cent by 
2030 at the centre of the EU’s NDC would 
be unconvincing and could weaken the 
Paris Agreement as a whole. This is one of 
the reasons why Member States such as 
France, Sweden, and the Benelux countries 
are calling for strengthening the 2030 tar-
get. In the run up to her election, the new 
Commission President, Ursula von der 
Leyen, has promised the EP an initiative to 
raise the target to at least 50 per cent. It is 
questionable, however, whether this can 
be agreed among the heads of state and 
government or whether a qualified majority 
can be achieved in the EU Council. 
Furthermore, a little-noticed dimension 
of Brexit comes into play when the United 
Kingdom – the second-largest emitter with 
reductions well above the EU average and a 
legally binding national climate target of 
around 57 per cent by 2030 – exits the EU. 
As a COP26 host, it is anticipated that the 
United Kingdom will decide not to remain a 
part of the EU’s NDC but to underpin its 
frontrunner role symbolically with its own 
NDC. On the basis of today’s legally binding 
targets under the ETS, the ESR, and the 
LULUCF Regulation, the EU-27 would then 
only achieve a reduction of about 37 per 
cent by 2030. 
Consequences for Member States 
A more ambitious EU 2030 target would 
not only require a higher annual emission 
reduction factor in the ETS, but also lead to 
a complicated re-negotiation of varying 
national mitigation targets under the Effort 
Sharing Regulation, covering more than 
half of the EU’s emissions. Current national 
targets vary between 40 per cent for Luxem-
bourg and Sweden and 0 per cent for Bul-
garia (by 2030, compared to 2005). Specific 
policies or instruments to reach emission 
reductions are not introduced at the EU 
level. Therefore, delivery is uncertain. 
A recent Commission evaluation of draft 
National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) 
shows that the majority of Member States 
are expected to miss their targets in 2030 – 
even with additional measures proposed in 
their NECPs. 
If a Member State misses its reduction 
target, it is allowed to buy surplus alloca-
tions from other Member States that over-
achieved their targets. For Germany – a 
country that is expected to miss its ESR 
targets in the coming years – initial calcu-
lations amount to several billion euros by 
2030, but only if there are enough over-
achievers able to sell ESR surpluses, which 
is far from clear. If Member States are not 
willing to strengthen national policies in 
the transport, building, and agriculture 
sectors, even under current targets the ESR 
might prove to be ineffective, which again 
would negatively affect the credibility of EU 
climate policy. 
Given the expected high costs, it does not 
come as a surprise that Member States such 
as Germany are willing to agree on a long-
term EU net zero target by 2050, but are 
reluctant when it comes to strengthening 
national ESR targets for 2030. An EU-wide 
compromise to raise the 2030 target, how-
ever, will not be possible without a new 
commitment by Germany and other large 
Member States. A decision in favour of a 
long-term EU climate neutrality target will 
only be credible if this is reflected in cor-
respondingly ambitious measures. But 
because the prospect of missing national 
targets now entails financial risks for Mem-
ber States, this might lead to a more cau-
tious approach among national govern-
ments. 
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